Go-stimuli proportion influences response strategy in a sustained attention to response task by Wilson, Kyle M. et al.
University of Huddersfield Repository
Wilson, Kyle M., Finkbeiner, Kristin M., de Joux, Neil R., Russell, Paul N. and Helton, William S.
Go-stimuli proportion influences response strategy in a sustained attention to response task
Original Citation
Wilson, Kyle M., Finkbeiner, Kristin M., de Joux, Neil R., Russell, Paul N. and Helton, William S. 
(2016) Go-stimuli proportion influences response strategy in a sustained attention to response task. 
Experimental Brain Research. ISSN 0014-4819 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/28723/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
1 3
Exp Brain Res
DOI 10.1007/s00221-016-4701-x
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Go-stimuli proportion influences response strategy in a sustained 
attention to response task
Kyle M. Wilson1,3 · Kristin M. Finkbeiner1 · Neil R. de Joux2 · Paul N. Russell1 · 
William S. Helton1 
Received: 6 October 2015 / Accepted: 2 June 2016 
© The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
and for more applied contexts where the consequences of 
response inhibition failures can be serious.
Keywords Sustained attention · Response inhibition · 
SART · Speed–accuracy trade-off · Task-related thought · 
Task-unrelated thought
Introduction
The sustained attention to response task (SART; Robert-
son et al. 1997) is a high Go, low No-Go response task 
developed to measure sustained attention in patients with 
traumatic brain injury to the frontal lobes. Many studies 
have used the SART as a measure of sustained attention 
(Chan 2001, 2002; Greene et al. 2009; Smallwood et al. 
2003, 2007). Typically, simple number stimuli (e.g. 1–9) 
have been used in the SART. Participants are tasked with 
responding to Go stimuli occurring 89 % of the time (num-
bers 1–9, except for 3), and to withhold responses to rarely 
occurring No-Go stimuli (the number 3). Performance is 
measured primarily by errors of commission (inappropri-
ately responding to a No-Go stimulus), errors of omission 
(inappropriately failing to respond to a Go stimulus) and 
reaction time to Go stimuli. Errors of commission normally 
occur much more frequently (30–50 %) than errors of 
omission (5–10 %) in the SART (Carter et al. 2013; Head 
and Helton 2012). Further, performance is typically charac-
terized by a speed–accuracy trade-off: people who respond 
faster to Go stimuli also inappropriately respond more 
often to No-Go stimuli (Helton 2009; Helton et al. 2005).
There is ongoing debate regarding the mechanism 
responsible for errors of commission in the SART. One 
perspective is that commission errors occur because of the 
monotonous nature of SART stimuli and the task itself. 
Abstract The sustained attention to response task (SART) 
usefulness as a measure of sustained attention has been 
questioned. The SART may instead be a better measure 
of other psychological processes and could prove useful 
in understanding some real-world behaviours. Thirty par-
ticipants completed four Go/No-Go response tasks much 
like the SART, with Go-stimuli proportions of .50, .65, .80 
and  .95. As Go-stimuli proportion increased, reaction times 
decreased while both commission errors and self-reported 
task-related thoughts increased. Performance measures 
were associated with task-related thoughts but not task-
unrelated thoughts. Instead of faster reaction times and 
increased commission errors being due to absentminded-
ness or perceptual decoupling from the task, the results 
suggested participants made use of two competing response 
strategies, in line with a response strategy or response inhi-
bition perspective of SART performance. Interestingly, 
performance measures changed in a nonlinear manner, 
despite the linear Go proportion increase. A threshold may 
exist where the prepotent motor response becomes more 
pronounced, leading to the disproportionate increase in 
response speed and commission errors. This research has 
implications for researchers looking to employ the SART 
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The task induces feelings of boredom and mind-wandering 
(Smallwood and Schooler 2006) or a state of mindlessness 
(Manly et al. 1999; Robertson et al. 1997) which in turn 
results in perceptual decoupling (failures to recognize the 
No-Go stimuli) and an automatic pattern of responding 
that requires little effort but is responsible for more com-
mission errors. From the mind-wandering perspective, this 
is said to be evidenced by an increase in task-unrelated 
thoughts. Proponents of the perceptual decoupling interpre-
tation do recognize that the speed–accuracy trade-off is a 
major feature of the SART; however, they attribute this to 
the supposed decoupling of conscious perception from the 
task, which induces faster responding to the Go stimuli and 
the inability to withhold responses to the No-Go stimuli 
(Manly et al. 1999; Robertson et al. 1997; Smallwood et al. 
2004).
A competing explanation is that the trade-off between 
speed of response to Go stimuli and the risk of responding 
to No-Go stimuli is the result of a deliberate response strat-
egy and not decreased external awareness of the identity 
of stimuli per se (Peebles and Bothell 2004). While SART 
instructions typically place equal emphasis on accuracy 
and response speed, participants may favour a strategy that 
maximizes speed over accuracy. Indeed, they may switch 
back and forth between these strategies dynamically (Head 
and Helton 2014). With 89 % “Go” trials and only 11 % 
“No-Go” trials, the benefit of speed on 89 % of trials may 
outweigh the costs to speed of slowing sufficiently on all 
trials to avoid inappropriate responses to No-Go stimuli 
(commission error) on only 11 % of trials. Peebles and 
Bothell (2004) show that an adaptive control of thought-
rational (ACT-R; Anderson and Lebiere 1998) model that 
incorporates two competing response strategies is able to 
successfully predict observed relationships between SART 
reaction times to Go stimuli and probability of commis-
sion errors. The two strategies in their model of SART 
performance are labelled “encode and click” (respond) 
and “encode and check”. In the encode and click strategy, 
the participant does not wait to analyse the contents of the 
stimuli but simply responds to the presence of any stimulus 
as quickly as possible. This strategy maximizes speed (par-
ticipants are instructed to respond quickly), which 89 % of 
the time is an effective strategy in the SART. Conversely, 
the encode and check strategy slows the response to all 
stimuli because it requires subjects to verify the identity 
(or at least response category) on all trials. This strategy 
results in slower responses on all trials, but facilitates the 
appropriate withholding of a response to No-Go stimuli. 
The strategy choice is dynamic, in that subjects may switch 
between the two. Rather than adopting one strategy though, 
they revise the strength of each strategy after each success 
or failure and make adjustments accordingly. For example, 
after a commission error the utility of “check” is enhanced, 
and after a fast correct Go response, “click’s” utility is 
boosted. This supports the idea that subjects are perceptu-
ally aware of the task, as opposed to decoupled during the 
task.
The strategy choice is likely influenced by multiple fac-
tors, such as top-down control and individual differences. 
Prior research has found, for example, that simply altering 
the task instructions to emphasize either speed or accu-
racy has a marked effect on task performance, indicating 
the role of top-down control or strategy choice (Seli et al. 
2012). In addition to top-down strategy choice, task char-
acteristics will affect the strategy adopted. For example, 
Head and Helton (2013, 2014) were able to artificially slow 
responses down (and thus reduce commission errors) by 
requiring participants to first move a mouse pointer towards 
stimuli before they had the opportunity to click to respond.
Another task characteristic likely to influence strat-
egy choice would be the relative proportion of Go stimuli 
to No-Go stimuli. The encode and click strategy (empha-
sizing response speed) should be biased to occur when 
there are higher Go-stimuli proportions, as a high-speed 
response strategy is maximally beneficial when Go stimuli 
are more prevalent. This should also result in overall faster 
response rates in the task with higher relative Go-stimuli 
proportions. The encode and check strategy (emphasizing 
accuracy) should, however, be biased to occur when there 
are relatively more No-Go stimuli, as the alternative strat-
egy emphasizing speed would result in more errors in this 
setting. This would result in a switch towards the slower 
encode and check strategy, and this would result in slower 
response rates to the Go stimuli. Closely examining behav-
iour while varying Go-stimuli proportion in the SART may 
shed further light on the debate between the perceptual 
decoupling and response strategy perspectives.
The SART, while an interesting research puzzle in and 
of itself given the competing theoretical perspectives, may 
also prove useful in understanding real-world behaviour. 
Wilson et al. (2014) conducted a simulated firearms task 
utilizing a Go/No-Go paradigm. Participants confronted a 
mixture of foes (Go stimuli) and friends (No-Go stimuli) 
in a simulation of a military or law enforcement scenario 
using human actors. They used proportions of high Go 
(.89), low Go (.11) and medium Go (.50). They found that 
participants failed to withhold responses (committed errors 
of commission or friendly fire) more often as the Go (foe) 
proportion increased. Interestingly, despite the Go propor-
tion increase being linear, the increase in errors of com-
mission was accelerating (not constant linear). There was 
no difference in commission errors between low Go and 
medium Go proportions; however, there was a large dif-
ference between the medium Go and high Go proportions. 
They were unable to measure response speed though so it 
was not clear what relationship this had with Go-stimuli 
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proportions. They went on to suggest that a breaking point 
or a threshold of sorts may exist, wherein a prepotent motor 
response (see Head and Helton 2014; Helton 2009; Helton 
et al. 2010; Robertson et al. 1997) takes precedence after 
the proportion of Go responses exceeds equal probability 
(.50). If such a threshold exists, it would be highly useful 
to be able to use response proportion to predict when a pre-
potent motor response may take effect and seriously ham-
per people’s ability to inhibit subsequent responses when 
required. In the context of friendly fire for instance, a law 
enforcement or military commander may be able to use 
knowledge of a combat zone to help predict when friendly 
fire accidents are at a particularly high risk of occurring.
The current experiment aimed to further explore how 
relative Go-/No-Go-stimuli proportion affects performance 
in the SART. To do this, a number of different proportions 
were used in a computer-based Go/No-Go task. Follow-
ing suggestions that the Go proportion’s most influential 
effects on response inhibition occur somewhere upwards 
of the 50 % Go-stimuli proportion (Wilson et al. 2014), 
four conditions beginning at 50 % Go stimuli and increas-
ing in equal intervals through to 95 % Go stimuli were 
used. Participants completed all four tasks in a repeated-
measures design. For each condition, the performance met-
rics of commission errors (failures to withhold to No-Go 
stimuli), omission errors (failures to respond to Go stimuli) 
and reaction times to Go stimuli were recorded along with 
a questionnaire to measure participants’ task-related and 
task-unrelated thoughts.
As the Go-stimuli proportion increases from .50 to .95, 
the opportunity to correct the speed-beneficial “click” in 
favour of “check” will occur less often. Considering the 
two theories of SART performance—perceptual decou-
pling and response strategy—both might predict that reac-
tion times to Go stimuli will decrease and errors of com-
mission rates will increase. A proponent of the response 
strategy perspective would argue this is because of the rela-
tive success of the two response strategies in conditions of 
differing Go-stimuli probability. Conversely, a proponent 
of the perceptual decoupling perspective may suggest this 
is because high proportions of Go stimuli lull participants 
into a more automatic disposition towards the task, which 
allows increased mind-wandering and mindlessness.
However, while the two perspectives may predict 
manipulations of Go-stimuli probability to have identical 
effects on reaction times and rate of commission errors, 
different predictions are made for self-reported incidences 
of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts. The two per-
spectives would differ in regard to the impact of differing 
Go-stimuli proportions on self-reports of task-related and 
task-unrelated thoughts. Within the perceptual decoupling 
perspective, a mindlessness proponent might hypothesize 
both task-related and task-unrelated thoughts will decrease 
in tasks with higher Go-stimuli proportions, as the higher 
Go-stimuli proportions would result in a reduction in over-
all conscious awareness (mindlessness) due to increased 
automaticity. Alternatively (but still within the perceptual 
decoupling perspective), a mind-wandering proponent 
might suggest task-unrelated thoughts will increase and 
task-related thoughts will decrease with increasing Go-
stimuli proportions. In addition, proponents of a mind-wan-
dering perspective would also suggest a positive correlation 
between reports of task-unrelated thoughts and commis-
sion error rates and a negative relationship between task-
unrelated thoughts and response time to Go stimuli. From 
the response strategy perspective, the person is fully aware 
of their ongoing performance during the task. This is evi-
denced by subjects “self-correcting” following errors of 
commission in the SART; reaction times increase following 
commission errors (Manly et al. 2000). Participants must 
be attentive to their commission errors to be able to correct 
for them, which they appear to do by altering their response 
strategy. Further, McAvinue et al. (2005) found that par-
ticipants were aware of their commission errors 99.1 % 
of the time. A proponent of the response strategy theory 
would suggest that increased commission errors occurring 
due to higher Go-stimuli proportions would instead result 
in increased concern and thoughts regarding task perfor-
mance. Reports of task-related thoughts should increase 
in higher Go-stimuli proportion conditions, as failures to 
appropriately withhold are very salient. Finally, if a thresh-
old exists wherein the prepotent motor programme dispro-
portionately increases in efficacy after Go-stimuli probabil-
ity surpasses a certain level, any increase in commission 
errors might be best characterized as an accelerating func-
tion as opposed to a constant linear function.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 30 (12 males and 18 females) undergrad-
uate students from the University of Canterbury, Christch-
urch, New Zealand. They ranged in age between 20 and 
54 years (M = 26.5, SD = 7.8). All had normal or cor-
rected to normal vision, and their participation was part of 
a course requirement.
Materials and procedure
Participants were tested in individual workstation cubicles, 
seated 50 cm in front of Phillips 225B2 LCD computer 
screens (1680 × 1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate) mounted 
at eye level. All stimulus and response timing were con-
trolled using E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
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Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) running on 3.40 GHz Intel i7 2600 
PC computers. Head movements were not restrained. Any 
wrist watches were removed, and mobile phones were 
switched off. Go/No-Go tasks that were modified versions 
of the SART (Robertson et al. 1997) were used. The origi-
nal SART uses a Go proportion of .89 (No-Go proportion 
of .11). We used four variations on this proportion in a 
repeated-measures design: .50, .65, .80 and .95. Each SART 
consisted of 208 stimuli presentations. Images of robots 
(approximately 85 mm × 85 mm) were used as Go and 
No-Go stimuli. One robot was an XM1219 Armed Robotoc 
Vehicle (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM1219_Armed_
Robotic_Vehicle#/media/File:FCS-MULE-ARV-2007.
jpg), and the other was a Legged Squad Support System 
(https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legged_Squad_Support_
System#/media/File:Leggedsquadsupportsystem0.png). 
Typically digit stimuli (1–9) have been used in the SART. 
This works well when solely using the original SART Go 
proportion of .89, as one of the nine digits (typically 3) is 
used as a No-Go stimulus and therefore all digits have the 
same chance of occurring (.11). In the current experiment 
however—because participants were required to respond 
to different proportions of stimuli over the four SARTs—
having various different digits representing No-Go stimuli 
would likely have been confusing as participants switched 
between Go-stimuli proportions. We wanted to avoid any 
additional cognitive load that may have been caused by par-
ticipants trying to remember which stimuli were Go stimuli 
and which were No-Go stimuli on any given SART. As well 
as the original images, mirror images of both robots were 
used for half of stimuli presentations to help ensure par-
ticipants did not simply respond to a basic shape template. 
Images were used instead of numbers to provide more real-
ism necessary for the future application of the Go/No-Go 
task to Shoot/Don’t-Shoot tasks (see Wilson et al. 2015b). 
In addition, a simpler set of stimuli should actually be more 
likely to induce the perceptual decoupling and mindless-
ness proposed by some SART researchers (see Head and 
Helton 2012). Other authors have successfully incorpo-
rated nondigit stimuli into the SART, such as Smallwood 
et al. (2009) who used “O” as a Go stimulus and “=” as a 
No-Go stimulus (see also Smallwood 2013). Two 16-item 
subscales of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; 
Matthews et al. 1999, 2002) were administered to collect 
reported thoughts before and after the tasks. Participants 
answered using a 5-pt Likert scale anchored with “never” 
(1) and “very often” (5). One subscale measured levels of 
task-related thoughts, while the other measured levels of 
task-unrelated thoughts.
After being seated at their workstations, participants 
completed a pre-task DSSQ. Pre-task measures were 
used as baselines for which to later compare with each of 
the post-task thought measures. To answer the pre-task 
measures, participants were told to “Please indicate roughly 
how often you had each thought DURING THE LAST 
TEN MINUTES”. After completing the pre-task DSSQ, 
participants were informed that they would be completing 
four separate Go/No-Go response tasks. Through random 
assignment, half of participants had the XM1219 Armed 
Robotoc Vehicle as the Go stimulus and the Legged Squad 
Support System as the No-Go stimulus, while the other 
half had the opposite. Participants’ Go- and No-Go-stimuli 
assignment remained the same for all four SARTs. Stimuli 
in each Go probability condition were presented in a dif-
ferent random order for each participant. Participants were 
instructed to respond, by pressing the spacebar, to Go stim-
uli and to withhold responses to No-Go stimuli. They were 
told to respond as fast and accurately as possible (speed and 
accuracy were emphasized equally). A practice task was 
administered before the first of the four trials began. This 
consisted of 20 trials with a Go-stimuli proportion of 50 %. 
Verbal accuracy feedback was given after each trial. The 
order in which tasks were completed was random. Imme-
diately before each task began, participants were informed 
of what the proportion of Go stimuli in the following task 
was to be. Stimuli were presented centrally on the screen 
for 250 ms, followed by a 900-ms mask consisting of a 
circle (29 mm in diameter) with a diagonal line through it. 
Thus, there was an 1150-ms stimuli onset to stimuli onset 
interval. Responses were recorded up to 900 ms follow-
ing stimuli onset. Each task lasted approximately 4.3 min. 
Immediately after each task participants completed a post-
task DSSQ. For each of the post-task DSSQs, participants 
were told “This questionnaire is concerned with your feel-
ings and thoughts DURING THE TASK that you have 
JUST COMPLETED”. The whole experiment took approx-
imately 28 min.
Results
Results from 2 of the 30 participants were removed due to 
both having excessive amounts of errors (both omission 
and commission), indicating that they had failed to follow 
task instructions.
SART performance
For each subject in each Go probability condition, we cal-
culated the proportion of commission errors (Fig. 1), the 
mean correct Go-stimuli reaction times (Fig. 2) and the 
proportion of omission errors (Fig. 3). One-way repeated-
measures ANOVAs were performed separately on each 
of the three performance measures. The primary research 
focus was to test trends regarding the increase or decrease 
in the performance measures with increasing Go-stimuli 
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probability (or decreasing No-Go-stimuli probability). We 
therefore used pre-planned orthogonal polynomial con-
trasts (Keppel and Zedeck 2001). These are 1-df contrasts 
in which concerns regarding sphericity assumptions do 
not apply. We limited our tests to the linear and quadratic 
trends, as we expected both linear and curvilinear trends. 
For errors of commission, there was a significant linear 
trend, F(1, 27) = 319.07, p < .001, η2
p
= .922 , and a signifi-
cant quadratic trend in the relationship, F(1, 27) = 10.45, 
p = .003, η2
p
= .279. As Go-stimuli proportion increased, 
so did errors of commission. For reaction times to the Go 
stimuli, there was a significant linear trend in the relation-
ship, F(1, 27) = 236.47, p < .001, η2
p
= .898 , and a sig-
nificant quadratic trend too, F(1, 27) = 37.50, p < .001, 
η
2
p
= .581. As Go-stimuli proportion increased, reaction 
times to the Go stimuli became faster. For errors of omis-
sion, there was no significant linear, F(1, 27) = .781, 
p = .384, η2
p
= .028, or quadratic trend, F(1, 27) = 1.99, 
p = .170, η2
p
= .069.
To further investigate the relationship between reaction 
time and errors of commission at each Go-stimuli propor-
tion, a correlation analysis was performed with the mean 
commission errors and mean reaction times for each pro-
portion (Table 1). At each proportion, the correlations 
are significant, p < .01. Furthermore, the association (r2) 
generally increases in strength as Go-stimuli proportion 
increases from .50 to .95.
Subjective state
For each subject, we calculated the average scores on the 
two DSSQ subscales (task-related thoughts and task-unre-
lated thoughts), once before the tasks began (pre-task) 
and once after each of the four tasks, for a total of five 
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Fig. 1  Mean proportion of errors of commission for each Go-stimuli 
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Fig. 3  Mean proportion of errors of omission for each Go-stimuli 
proportion. Error bars are standard errors
Table 1  Correlation between reaction time and commission errors at 
each Go-stimuli proportion
All p < .01
Go-stimuli proportion .50 .65 .80 .95
Correlation (r2) −.483 −.613 −.762 −.643
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Fig. 4  Mean task-related thoughts for each Go-stimuli proportion. 
Error bars are standard errors
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measures. For both subscales (see Figs. 4, 5) we performed 
a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. The assumptions 
of sphericity were checked using Mauchly’s test. This was 
primarily to test the pre-task questionnaire values with the 
post-task values. To test the differences amongst the differ-
ent Go-stimuli probability conditions, we used pre-planned 
orthogonal polynomial contrasts as was the case with the 
SART performance metrics, excluding the pre-task base-
line measure.
There was a significant effect of time on task-related 
thoughts, F(4, 108) = 6.32, p < .001, η2
p
= .190. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Bonferroni correction revealed that 
post-task task-related thoughts for both the .80 proportion 
and the .95 proportion were significantly higher than the 
pre-task task-related thoughts measure, p < .01. Polyno-
mial contrasts with just the four different Go-stimuli prob-
abilities revealed a significant linear trend, F(1, 27) = 5.03, 
p = .033, η2
p
= .157, with task-related thoughts increas-
ing with increasing Go-stimuli probability. For task-unre-
lated thoughts, there was a significant effect of time, F(4, 
108) = 25.93, p < .001, η2
p
= .490. Post hoc comparisons 
using the Bonferroni correction revealed that all of the 
four post-task task-unrelated thoughts measures were sig-
nificantly lower than the pre-task task-unrelated thoughts 
measure, p < .01. Polynomial contrasts with just the four 
different Go-stimuli probabilities failed to show any signifi-
cant trends. However, while not statistically significant, a 
potential linear relationship was observed in the direction 
of decreasing task-unrelated thoughts with increasing Go-
stimuli probability, F(1, 27) = 2.88, p = .101, η2
p
= .096.
Relationship between SART performance 
and subjective state
Both between-subjects and within-subjects correlations 
were investigated through the use of an established tech-
nique (see Head and Helton 2014; Zelenski and Larsen 
2000). To investigate between-subjects correlations, each 
participant’s performance metric on the SART and their 
self-report responses (i.e. their mean average value for 
a condition) were averaged over the four conditions and 
then the correlations between these individual averages 
were calculated. Between-subjects correlations isolate the 
differences that can be attributed solely to trait individual 
differences after removing within-subjects variance. It is 
between-subjects correlations that are most commonly ana-
lysed in the SART (see Seli 2016). To investigate within-
subjects correlations, for each condition each participant’s 
performance metric and self-report responses were con-
verted to standardized within-subjects z-scores (see Head 
and Helton 2014; Zelenski and Larsen 2000) resulting in 4 
reaction time z-scores, 4 commission error z-scores and so 
on for each of the metrics and questionnaire responses. The 
resulting z-scores were then combined across participants 
for the analysis or chained (see Head and Helton 2014; 
Helton et al. 2014). Table 2 displays the results of these 
analyses.
Errors of commission were significantly correlated with 
reaction time both within subjects and between subjects. 
At the within-subjects level, when a participant quick-
ened their own rate of responding they were more likely 
to make a commission error themselves, and equally at 
the between-subjects level, participants who generally 
responded faster than other participants were more likely 
to also make more commission errors on average. Errors of 
commission were significantly positively correlated with 
task-related thoughts at the within-subjects level. When 
participants experienced an increase in thoughts about the 
task, this coincided with an increase in commission errors. 
At the between-subjects level, this result was reversed, with 
participants who reported higher task-related thoughts gen-
erally making fewer errors of commission. This was simi-
larly seen with errors of omission, where participants who 
reported higher task-related thoughts also generally made 
Table 2  Correlations between variables
Within subjects above main diagonal; between subjects below main 
diagonal
* p < .05; ** p < .01, for an N of 28
EC EO RT TRT TUT
Errors of commis-
sion (EC)
.144 −.920** .296** −.188
Errors of omission 
(EO)
.027 −.107 .152 .164
Reaction time (RT) −.784** .209 −.295** .184
Task-related 
thoughts (TRT)
−.397* −.437* .229 −.092
Task-unrelated 
thoughts (TUT)
−.363 −.265 .170 .319
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Fig. 5  Mean task-unrelated thoughts for each Go-stimuli proportion. 
Error bars are standard errors
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less omission errors. Finally, at the within-subjects level 
increases in task-related thoughts within participants cor-
responded with them speeding up their reaction time to Go 
stimuli. Task-unrelated thoughts shared no significant rela-
tionships with any of the measures.
It was possible that the correlation between commis-
sion errors and task-related thoughts was influenced by 
participants’ response times, as has been noted before (Wil-
son et al. 2015a). To examine whether this was the case, 
a partial correlation was conducted. The partial correlation 
between task-related thoughts and errors of commission 
(between subjects) when controlling for response time was 
r = −.359, p = .066.
Discussion
The current experiment investigated how performance on a 
high Go, low No-Go task and associated thought content 
changed as Go-stimuli proportion was manipulated across 
four conditions: .5, .65, .80 and .95 proportions. Measures 
of errors of commission, errors of omission and reaction 
times were taken to gauge SART performance, while two 
subscales of the DSSQ—task-related thoughts and task-
unrelated thoughts—were used to measure self-reported 
thoughts.
The finding that as Go-stimuli proportions increased, 
reaction times decreased and commission errors increased 
could be accounted for by both the perceptual decoupling 
theory and the response strategy perspectives. The percep-
tual decoupling theory would suggest that the higher Go-
stimuli proportions would have led to participants being 
lulled into more automatic responding, which should have 
resulted in either increased mindlessness or mind-wan-
dering. If so, this should have been clearly reflected in the 
task-related thoughts and task-unrelated thoughts reported. 
However, this was not the case. Instead of task-related 
thoughts decreasing as Go-stimuli proportion became 
higher, they increased. Participants were evidently atten-
tive to the task and therefore perceptually engaged rather 
than decoupled. Instead of task-unrelated thoughts increas-
ing, as the perceptual decoupling view might predict, they 
appeared to actually decrease as Go-stimuli proportion 
increased. However, it should be noted that one interpre-
tation of the perceptual decoupling model (mindless-
ness) might have successfully predicted the reduction in 
task-unrelated thoughts, but would have also predicted a 
decrease in task-related thoughts as well (true mindless-
ness—as in no conscious thoughts). Nonetheless, if partici-
pants had been perceptually decoupled from the task and 
engaged with mind-wandering, task-unrelated thoughts 
should have been positively associated with errors of com-
mission and negatively associated with reaction time. 
Conversely, correlation analyses showed that task-unrelated 
thoughts shared no statistically significant relationship with 
commission errors or reaction times at either the within-
subjects or the between-subjects level, and all four post-
task measures of task-unrelated thoughts were significantly 
lower than the initial pre-task measure. Although not statis-
tically significant, the direction of the correlations between 
task-unrelated thoughts and errors of commission and reac-
tion times were actually in the opposite direction. Partici-
pants who reported more task-unrelated thoughts actually 
tended to make less commission errors (and this was true 
both within and between subjects). To the contrary, it was 
task-related thoughts that were significantly associated with 
errors of commission and reaction times at the within-sub-
jects level and with errors of commission at the between-
subjects level. This reflects the involvement or entangle-
ment of the speed–accuracy trade-off with participants’ 
thoughts about the task, and this has also been seen in pre-
vious research with the SART (Wilson et al. 2015a). As to 
the cause of this relationship, it could be that participants 
who think more about the task then speed up their respond-
ing in an attempt to perform even better, but in doing so 
they inevitably have more difficulty withholding to the 
No-Go stimuli and thus make more commission errors. Or 
perhaps the act of making commission errors causes them 
to think more about the task (e.g. performance appraisal). 
Neither explanation fits with the perceptual decoupling 
idea. Instead, these explanations indicate participants’ con-
scious engagement with the task and are consistent with 
the idea that people are aware of the errors they make and 
that their reaction times over the task are contingent upon 
this awareness. Indeed, when a partial correlation was used 
to account for the influence of response time, the relation-
ship between commission errors and task-related thoughts 
(between subjects) was no longer statistically significant 
(although the strength of the correlation was only slightly 
reduced). Regarding the task-related thoughts measure, it 
should be noted that task-related thoughts could in some 
circumstances be also classified as instances of mind-
wandering. Some thoughts about the task may be due to 
a participant experiencing performance anxiety, for exam-
ple worrying thoughts that their performance is poor. 
This highlights an area within the literature where further 
clarification is required. In the current study, we used task-
un-related thoughts as the primary measure for off-task 
thoughts, as has typically been done (e.g. Birnie et al. 2015; 
Carter et al. 2013; Seli et al. 2015; Staub et al. 2014).
The differential effects that the varying Go-stimuli pro-
portions had on commission errors and reaction time can be 
accounted for by the ACT-R model (Anderson and Lebiere 
1998). The different Go-stimuli proportions each offered 
different opportunities in terms of the ideal response 
strategy for a given proportion. As expected, at higher 
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Go-stimuli proportions participants favoured the encode 
and click strategy, evidenced by faster reaction times at 
the cost of more commission errors, whereas at lower Go-
stimuli proportions participants used the encode and check 
strategy more often, demonstrated by slower reaction times 
but fewer commission errors (Peebles and Bothell 2004). 
Note that Peebles and Bothell’s (2004) account of SART 
responding bears similarities with the literature on other 
tasks requiring response inhibition, such as the stop-signal 
paradigm (see Logan 1994 for a review on this paradigm). 
Logan and Cowan (1984) found that increasing the prob-
ability that a participant would have to respond on tri-
als (Go proportion) increased the strength of participants’ 
motor responses and impaired their ability to withhold 
the response when required. Ramautar et al. (2004) also 
observed that participants tended to sacrifice accuracy for 
speed when the probability of stop-signals (essentially 
No-Go trials) decreased. Much of the literature on response 
inhibition paradigms such as the stop-signal task may be 
concordant with research on the SART, particularly Pee-
bles and Bothell’s account of SART responding. Indeed, 
it appears that response inhibition is firmly implicated in 
SART performance (Carter et al. 2013; Stevenson et al. 
2011). It may be beneficial to attempt to consolidate these 
two different literatures in future.
The trend analyses provide a degree of support for the 
idea that a threshold exists wherein the feed-forward pre-
potent motor programme disproportionately increases in 
strength, leading to an abrupt shortening of response times 
and increase in commission errors. Commission errors had a 
curvilinear trend, whereby they initially gradually increased 
as Go-stimuli proportion became higher, but then increased 
markedly over the higher proportions, showing a similar pat-
tern to that seen by Wilson et al. (2014). In their experiment 
they were unable to measure reaction time however, so the 
finding that in the present study reaction time exhibited a 
curvilinear trend and appeared to have an inverse relation-
ship with errors of commission is notable. For the partici-
pant, a prepotent motor response ensures that the response 
is fast and without delay; however, it also makes withhold-
ing responses (when required) more difficult and therefore 
less likely. This is not the first time that an inverse relation-
ship between speed and reaction time in the SART has been 
found. Head and Helton (2014) observed that SART perfor-
mance oscillated over sessions spaced apart by a number 
of weeks. In sessions where participants tended to respond 
slower they made fewer commission errors, and conversely 
in sessions when they responded faster they made more com-
mission errors. In the current experiment, the decreases in 
reaction time appeared to inversely mirror the increases in 
commission errors, with the biggest decrease between condi-
tions appearing to occur between the .65 and .80 Go-stimuli 
proportions. This appeared to be reflected in the self-reported 
thoughts too. A visual inspection of the data for task-related 
thoughts (see Fig. 4 in “Results” section) suggested that 
the increase over Go-stimuli proportions was primarily due 
to a rise specifically between the .65 and .80 proportions. 
Although tests of this did not reach statistical significance, 
other tests did show that the only conditions where task-
related thoughts were significantly higher than the pre-task 
baseline were the .80 and .95 proportions. In terms of the 
strength of the relationship between reaction time and com-
mission errors at each Go-stimuli proportion, correlation 
analyses demonstrated that these associations generally 
became stronger as Go-stimuli proportion went from .50 to . 
95. In terms of the practical value of this in operational envi-
ronments, being able to predict when a prepotent response 
may take precedence in an environment where a human is 
responding often and withholding responses less often, could 
be important information. For instance, a military or law 
enforcement commander may be able to use this knowledge 
to recognize when weapons operators are at a higher risk of 
committing friendly fire errors (see Wilson et al. 2013, 2014, 
2015b). Nonetheless, it should be noted that tests for linear 
trends for reaction times and commission errors were also 
statistically significant in the current experiment, and further 
investigation of the disproportionate change in the SART 
performance metrics is required.
Correlation analyses revealed strong negative rela-
tionships, at both the within- and between-subjects level, 
between errors of commission and reaction time, the speed–
accuracy trade-off. Errors of omission shared no association 
with reaction time and commission errors. There was, how-
ever, a significant negative correlation between task-related 
thoughts and omission errors and commission errors at the 
between-subjects level. People who tended to report more 
task-related thoughts tended to make less errors of omis-
sion and less errors of commission. Task-related thoughts 
had a significant positive correlation with errors of com-
mission and a significant negative correlation with reaction 
time at the within-subjects level. When people tended to 
report more task-related thoughts, they tended to make more 
errors of commission and had faster reaction times. This is 
likely due to common fate with increasing Go-stimuli prob-
abilities; increases in task-related thoughts were linked with 
increasing Go-stimuli proportions and probably occurred 
independently of the changes in the behavioural metrics. 
Participants tended with high Go-stimuli probabilities to 
respond faster, make more errors of commission and report 
more task-related thoughts.
Future research should look to further disentangle the 
nature of the notable decrease in people’s ability to with-
hold in Go/No-Go tasks, which appears to be closely 
related to the proportion of Go to No-Go stimuli and the 
response strategy used. In terms of the proportions that 
researchers should look to employ, using more intervals 
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within the .5 to 1.0 Go-stimuli proportions should help to 
determine or narrow down the proportions of particular 
interest. A useful addition may also be a condition where 
100 % of responses required are Go-stimuli responses. This 
will enable a ceiling reaction time to be established. Per-
haps at a Go-stimuli proportion of .95, like the highest pro-
portion that was employed here, participants are very close 
to a “ceiling” reaction time and physically at their limits 
anyway. However, the fact that participants in this .95 pro-
portion condition were still able to occasionally withhold 
responses to No-Go stimuli, albeit only around 30 % of the 
time, suggests that their limits can be pushed further.
In the current experiment, participants appeared to 
adopt the response strategy that provided the most utility 
for each of the differing Go-stimuli proportions. In a high 
Go task such as the SART, response inhibition appears to 
be dictated by response strategy, and this in turn seems to 
be determined by, or at least strongly influenced by, Go-
stimuli proportion. This relationship may become stronger 
when a virtual “breaking point” or threshold is reached. 
This threshold appears to be somewhere between the .65 
and .80 Go-stimuli proportion. The functional relationship 
between Go-stimuli proportion and errors deserves further 
exploration. The findings of this research provide further 
evidence that performance on the SART, and perhaps by 
extension high Go/low No-Go tasks, is heavily influenced 
by response strategy and response inhibition. Sustained 
attention may nevertheless contribute to performance on 
the task; however, this may involve a form of internally 
directed attention (executive control is required to regulate 
response strategies) as opposed to externally directed atten-
tion (e.g. perceptual decoupling). Researchers who intend 
to measure externally directed attention, perceptual cou-
pling, would be better served by using a different measure 
than the SART. The SART may be a useful tool for other 
purposes however, such as modelling behaviour in Shoot/
Don’t-Shoot scenarios (Wilson et al. 2015b). Performance 
in the SART appears to be determined by a different meas-
ure (response strategy) than what many researchers are 
currently intending to measure (sustained attention). The 
findings here cannot easily be explained by a perceptual 
decoupling model. More specifically, the mind-wandering 
interpretation of SART performance errors requires closer 
scrutiny. The current findings are consistent with a theory 
of strategic responding in the SART. How consciously 
reported thoughts influence strategy choice in the SART 
remains a topic for future research.
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